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PERSISTENT THREATS TO COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Jonathan H. Adler*
The current Supreme Court is very protective of speech,
including commercial speech. Threats to commercial speech persist
nonetheless. This article briefly examines two: the use of
commercial speech restrictions as a form of rent-seeking, and
compelled commercial speech. Regulation of commercial speech is
sometimes used to protect established corporate interests from
competitors who are less able to bear the costs of regulation, with
consequences that extend beyond the economic marketplace. In the
case of commercial speech, courts have also been unduly deferential
to claims of a consumer “right to know” as a basis for mandated
labeling and disclosure. Greater and more consistent protection of
commercial speech would be necessary to guard against these
threats.
INTRODUCTION
Free speech may be under fire in America today,1 but not at One
First Street. Under Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court has
*

Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the Center for
Business Law & Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
This paper is based upon remarks delivered at the symposium, “Free Speech
Under Fire: The Future of the First Amendment” at Brooklyn Law School on
February 26, 2016. The author thanks Adam Parker-Lavine for research
assistance. All errors, omissions, or inanities are solely the fault of the author.
1
See, e.g., James Coll, Opinion, Free Speech under Siege, ALB. TIMES
UNION (Mar. 23, 2016), http://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/Free-speechunder-siege-6923876.php (noting threats to political speech and protest); Donal
Brown, Free Speech under Siege at Some U.S. Universities, FIRST AMEND.
COALITION (Feb. 18, 2016), https://firstamendmentcoalition.org/2016/02/freespeech-under-siege-at-some-u-s-universities/ (noting threats to free speech on
college campues); George Leef, Free Speech under Siege in America, FORBES
(Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2015/12/11/free-
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been quite protective of speech.2 From offensive protests3 and lies
about military service,4 to violent video games5 and campaignrelated expenditures,6 the Supreme Court has continued to expand

speech-under-siege-in-america/ (noting contemporary threats to free speech);
Taylor Maycan, Study: Nearly Half of Millennials Not on Board with Free
Speech,
USA
TODAY
(Nov.
25,
2015),
http://college.usatoday.com/2015/11/25/millennials-free-speech-pew-survey/
(noting declining support for broad speech protections among younger
generations). See generally GREG LUKAINOFF, UNLEARNING LIBERTY: CAMPUS
CENSORSHIP AND THE END OF AMERICAN DEBATE (2012) (featuring several
accounts of censorship on college campuses and suggesting broader threats to
open discourse).
2
See, e.g., Joel Gora, In the Business of Free Speech: The Roberts Court and
Citizens United, in BUSINESS AND THE ROBERTS COURT 255 (Jonathan H. Adler
ed., 2016) (noting the Roberts Court has generally “left constitutional speech
rights much stronger than they were found”); BURT NEUBORNE, MADISON’S
MUSIC: ON READING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 11 (2015) (describing the Roberts
Court as the “strongest First Amendment Supreme Court in our history”).
3
See generally Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 433 (2011) (discussing that the
First Amendment protects peaceful protesters on a matter of public concern near
the funeral of a military service member from tort liability).
4
See generally United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012)
(invalidating federal law criminalizing false claims about military decorations).
5
See generally Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 546 U.S. 786 (2011)
(invalidating state law prohibiting the sale of violent video games to minors).
6
See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 588 U.S. 310
(2010) (invalidating prohibition on corporate and union expenditures supporting
or opposing candidates for political office).
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the range of expression protected by the First Amendment.7
Commercial speech is no exception.8
Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has consistently
protected commercial speech under the First Amendment.9 Existing
commercial speech jurisprudence recognizes the consumer and
citizen interests that justify safeguarding the free flow of
information about products and services.10 If anything, the degree of
protection most commercial speech retains is on the rise.11
7

See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (holding the First
Amendment protects depictions of animal cruelty). Those cases in which the
Court has rejected claims of First Amendment protection for expressive activity
are rather limited. See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1
(2010) (rejecting First Amendment claim against federal law criminalizing the
provision of non-violent material support to a terrorist organization); Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding public employee statements pursuant to
their official duties are not protected by the First Amendment and may be subject
to employer discipline). While Holder upheld the prohibition as applied to the
provision of legal services, the Court held that independent advocacy in support
of such organizations remains protected. Holder, 561 U.S. at 24.
8
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Care, 564 U.S. 552 (2011) (invalidating
law restricting the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy records that reveal
prescribing practices of individual doctors).
9
See, e.g., id.; Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002)
(invalidating prohibitions on pharmacy advertising for drug compounding); 44
Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (invalidating prohibition on
price advertising for alcoholic beverages). Not all commentators see this as a
positive development. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech and the
First Amendment: History, Data, Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENTARY 223,
239 (2015) (lamenting “corporate takeover of the First Amendment”); Tamara R.
Piety, Why Personhood Matters, 30 CONST. COMMENTARY 361, 378–79 (2015)
[hereinafter Piety, Why Personhood Matters] (criticizing the doctrine of corporate
personhood in relation to protection of commercial speech).
10
See, e.g., Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 579 (2011) (“The commercial marketplace,
like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and
information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of slight
worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the
government, assess the value of the information presented.”) (quoting Edenfield
v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S.
405, 411 (2011) (“First Amendment values are at serious risk if the government
can compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special
subsidies for speech on the side that it favors.”).
11
See Rodney A. Smolla, Afterword: Free the Fortune 500! The Debate over
Corporate Speech and the First Amendment, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1277, 1292

292

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

While commercial speech enjoys a substantial degree of
protection, there are threats on the horizon.12 In this brief essay, I
(2004) (“Examination of the actual case decisions demonstrates that the trajectory
of modern commercial speech law has been an accelerating rise of protection for
advertising.”).
12
Among the threats to commercial speech is the low regard with which
constitutional protection of commercial speech is held by most legal academics
who write in this area. See, e.g., TAMARA PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (2013) (arguing First
Amendment protection of commercial speech limits the government’s ability to
act in the public interest); C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial
Speech¸ 84 IND. L.J. 981, 981 (2009) (arguing that commercial speech should not
have the protection of the First Amendment); Coates IV, supra note 9, at 223
(asserting that constitutional protection of commercial speech has resulted in the
displacement of individual First Amendment Rights, reflecting “wasteful rent
seeking”); Amanda Shanor & Robert Post, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128
HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 166 (2015) (criticizing judicial deregulation of speech in
the marketplace); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech,
48 UCLA L. REV 1, 4–5 (2000) (arguing that the test for commercial speech
should be revisited); Ellen Goodman, Dangerous Corporate First Amendment
Overreach: Three Information Trends and a Data Application, PUB. KNOWLEDGE
(May 25, 2016), https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/dangerouscorporate-first-amendment-overreach-three-information-trends-and-a-dataapplication (examining the consequences of protected commercial speech); Tim
Wu, The Right to Evade Regulation: How Corporations Hijacked the First Amendment,
NEW REPUBLIC (June 3, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/113294/howcorporations-hijacked-first-amendment-evade-regulation (detailing the transformation
of the First Amendment protections for corporations). There are exceptions to the
prevailing view, however. See, e.g., MARTIN REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST
AMENDMENT 75–121 (2013) (arguing for expansive First Amendment protection
of commercial speech]); Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information
Libertarianism, 105 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 5) (on file
with authors) (arguing in favor of the expansive protection of commercial speech
by adopting a libertarian model of free speech); see also Alex Kozinski & Stuart
Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 652 (1990)
(“[I]n a free market economy, the ability to give and receive information about
commercial matters may be as important, sometimes more important, than
expression of a political, artistic, or religious nature.”); Martin H. Redish, The
First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free
Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 472–73 (1971) (arguing that commercial
speech serves an important interest and that “there may be a legitimate place for
the commercial element within the boundaries of the first amendment.”); Rodney
Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive
Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993)
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will focus on two. The first threat comes from speech regulation that
is driven by rent-seeking.13 Economic interests regularly seek to
restrict commercial speech as a way of suppressing competition,
often by prohibiting or limiting the disclosure of factually true
information about products or services.14 Regulation of advertising
and other communication about products and services is an effective
way to control the underlying market and pursue competitive
advantage.
The second threat comes from compelled commercial speech.
Governments at all levels routinely impose speech requirements,
such as mandatory labels or other disclosures,15 for a variety of
reasons. Examples of such requirements range from mandatory
nutrition labels16 and mandatory energy efficiency disclosures for
motor vehicles and appliances,17 to disclosure requirements on
imported meat,18 debt-relief advisors,19 and attorney advertising.20

(“Commercial speech, as speech should presumptively enter the debate with full
First Amendment protection. The theoretical question should not be what qualifies
commercial speech for First Amendment coverage, but what, if anything
disqualifies it.”).
13
See infra note 55 (defining rent-seeking).
14
See infra notes 56–59, 88 and accompanying text.
15
See Brian E. Roe et al., The Economics of Voluntary Versus Mandatory
Labels, 6 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 407, 408–09 (2014) (“[P]roduct labeling is
an increasingly popular tool of regulators.”).
16
See 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(a) (2016) (“Nutrition information relating to food
shall be provided for all products intended for human consumption and offered
for sale.”).
17
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 259.2 (1995) (requiring automobile advertisers to
disclose fuel economy based on certain standards to avoid consumer confusion);
16 C.F.R. §§ 305.1, 305.3, 305.5, 305.11 (2015) (requiring all consumer appliances
to carry a label describing water use, energy consumption, energy efficiency,
energy cost—determined based on standards established for appliances from
refrigerators to lamps).
18
See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 746 F.3d 1065 (D.C. Cir.
2014), aff’d en banc 760 F.3d. 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
19
See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229
(2010).
20
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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At present, such requirements are often subject to minimal
scrutiny in federal court.21 This makes compelled commercial
speech an attractive means for suppressing competition or otherwise
utilizing government regulation to enhance corporate power or
advance other interests. The relative ease with which disclosure and
labeling requirements are imposed threatens core First Amendment
values and undermines the robust protection of commercial speech
more generally.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly summarizes the
Supreme Court’s approach to commercial speech. Part II discusses
how commercial speech often implicates the same values and
concerns that underlie constitutional protection of noncommercial
speech. Part III discusses the threat to commercial speech posed by
rent-seeking and special interest efforts to gain a competitive
advantage by limiting speech that may inform or educate consumers.
Part IV discusses the threat posed by compelled commercial speech,
particularly in light of widespread arguments that such speech
should be subject to minimal constitutional scrutiny.
I. PROTECTING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The Supreme Court first extended constitutional protection to
commercial speech in the 1970s.22 Since then, the Court has
consistently held that “[t]he fact that the speech is in aid of a
commercial purpose does not deprive [the speaker] of all First
Amendment protection.”23 Indeed, the Court has noted repeatedly
21

See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst., 746 F.3d at 1068 (upholding mandatory countryof-origin labels for meat products as against First Amendment Challenge);
Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 2015) (upholding
mandatory GMO content labels against First Amendment Challenge); CTIA-The
Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1075 (2015) (holding
that local ordinances requiring disclosure of alleged radio frequency risks posed
by cellular telephones did not violate First Amendment); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n
v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding mercury labeling law for
light bulbs where requirement was part of a broader regulatory scheme). Cf. Nat’l
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(holding mandatory “conflict mineral” disclosure violates First Amendment rights
of regulated firms), aff’d on reh’g, 800 F.3d 518, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
22
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975).
23
United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 410 (2001).
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that a “consumer’s concern for the free flow of commercial speech
often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political
dialogue.”24
In its first decisions protecting commercial speech, the Court
emphasized the value of information about goods and services to
consumers.25 As the Court explained in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free
enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources
in large measure will be made through numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public
interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be
intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free
flow of commercial information is indispensable.26
On this basis, the Court concluded that commercial speech
should be protected by the First Amendment, but not to quite the
same degree as core protected speech, such as political speech.27
Less explicit in the Court’s decisions was the recognition that
commercial speech can also serve to advance the broader interests
of democratic self-governance.28 Yet as the Court noted in Virginia
24

See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011) (quoting
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977)).
25
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 818. The Court had noted the value of
commercial speech in earlier cases. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh
Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (noting that “the
exchange of information is as important in the commercial realm as in any other”).
26
Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 765. The opinion also noted that commercial
speech “is indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise
system, it is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how
that system ought to be regulated or altered.” Id. at 765.
27
Id. at 770 (“In concluding that commercial speech, like other varieties, is
protected, we of course do not hold that it can never be regulated in any way.
Some forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible.”).
28
See Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 12, at 4 (noting protection of
commercial speech “harmonizes with the democratic self-governance and
personal autonomy theories that most legal scholars embrace”); see also Robert
Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2372 (2000) (recognizing relationship between commercial
information and democratic self-governance); Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not
“Low Value” Speech, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 85 (1999) (challenging the notion that
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State Board, much commercial speech is also “indispensable to the
formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be
regulated or altered,” and thus helps to “enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy.”29
In the 1980 case, Central Hudson Gas and Electric v. Public
Service Commission,30 the Court outlined a form of intermediate
scrutiny for analyzing government restrictions on commercial speech:
For commercial speech to come within [the First
Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.31
Since then, the degree of protection afforded to commercial
expression has, if anything, increased. Several Justices have
suggested Central Hudson should be revisited.32 Perhaps more
commercial information or advertising is less valuable than other forms of
speech); Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism
and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 81
(2007) (“[S]peech concerning commercial products and services can facilitate
private self-government in much the same way that political speech fosters
collective self-government.”). Courts and commentators have also often neglected
the political and cultural content of many otherwise “commercial” messages. See,
e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Robert Bork & Commercial Speech, 10 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 615 (2014) [hereinafter Adler, Robert Bork & Commercial Speech].
29
Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 765.
30
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
31
Id. at 566.
32
See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“I do not see a
philosophical or historical basis for asserting that ‘commercial’ speech is of
‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ speech.”); id. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (“I share Justice Thomas’s discomfort with
the Central Hudson test, which seems to me to have nothing more than policy
intuition to support it.”); see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357,
367–68 (2002) (dismissing other justices’ apprehensions as to applicability of
Central Hudson); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409–10
(2001) (noting “criticism” of Central Hudson test by multiple justices); Robert
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significantly, on more than one occasion, the Court’s decisions have
seemed to apply greater protections to commercial speech regulations
than Central Hudson’s stated test requires.33 For these reasons,
commercial speech has seemed fairly secure in the Supreme Court.
II. COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND NONCOMMERCIAL VALUES
Even if one agrees that commercial speech should be protected
and that the Supreme Court has been correct to apply First
Amendment protections to such speech, there is ample space to
question the coherence and consistency of the Court’s commercial
speech jurisprudence.34 One deficiency in the Court’s reasoning
(matched in much of the relevant academic literature) is the failure
to give adequate regard to the extent to which otherwise
“commercial” messages and communications permeate broader
political and cultural discourse. Much commercial speech is imbued,
if not saturated, with normative and political content.35

Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and
Coerced Commercial Associations in United Foods, Zauderer, and Abood,
40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 558 n. 15 (2006) [hereinafter Post, Transparent and
Efficient] (“More than a majority of the justices have at one time or another
indicated their dissatisfaction with the test.”); David C. Vladeck, Lessons from a
Story Untold: Nike v. Kasky Reconsidered, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1049, 1052
(2004) (“Since 44 Liquormart, the Court has made it clear that it would be willing
to revisit the doctrine should the appropriate case come along.”).
33
See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 546 U.S. 552, 571 (2011) (suggesting
that a higher level of scrutiny is appropriate where a state imposes “content-and
speaker-based restrictions on protected expression”). Cf. Reed v. Town of Gilbert,
135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015) (classifying a law that is “content based on its face”
being subject to strict scrutiny).
34
See, e.g., Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, The Chickens Have Come Home to
Roost: Individualism, Collectivism and Conflict in Commercial Speech Doctrine,
9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 237, 238 (2004) (The Supreme Court trying to “carve a path”
between collectivism or individualism has only “created dissention, confusion and
nearly continual calls for clarity among the justices”); Thomas C. Goldstein, Nike
v. Kasky and the Definition of “Commercial Speech,” 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 63, 71 (noting “the ambiguities and conflicting signals” in the Court’s
commercial speech jurisprudence).
35
See Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer
Right-to-Know, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 429–31 (2016) (discussing examples of
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Commercial advertising and product labeling routinely appeal to
potential customers’ normative preferences and cultural values.36
Corporations expend substantial resources seeking to create cultural
and other affinities with particular consumer groups and cultural
constituencies.37 After the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell
v. Hodges,38 for example, numerous Fortune 500 companies covered
their logos with the rainbow that has come to symbolize gay rights,
celebrating the Court’s decision in the context of brand messaging.39
This was commercial speech, but it also contained a powerful
political and cultural message.
Individual purchasing decisions and commercial activities are
often imbued with political and normative content as well.40
commercial speech with normative and political content) [hereinafter Adler,
Compelled Commercial Speech]; see Troy, supra note 28, at 85.
36
See, e.g., Douglas B. Holt et al., How Global Brands Compete, HARV.
BUS. REV., Sept. 2004, at 68, 69–72 (noting that consumers look to brand
identification to determine product quality, social responsibility of the
manufacturer, and the cultural ideals associated with the product).
37
See, e.g., EDUC. FUNDING PARTNERS, CAUSE MARKETING: THE CASE FOR
CORPORATE MARKETING INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC EDUCATION TO GROW MINDS
AND
MINDSHARE
(2012),
http://www.edufundingpartners.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/EFP-White-Paper-Cause-Marketing-in-Education-912-Final.pdf (“[A]merican companies spent $1.1 billion in 2005 on cause
marketing programs. In 2009, that investment increased by 43 percent to $1.57
billion, demonstrating an increased commitment by companies to link their
marketing efforts to social causes despite the economic downturn.”).
38
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
39
See Susana Kim & Alexa Valiente, Same-Sex Marriage: How Companies
Responded to Supreme Court’s Decision, ABC NEWS (June 26, 2015),
abcnews.go.com/Business/sex-marriage-companies-responded-supreme-courtsdecision/story?id=32053240; Alison Griswold, Brands Are Draping Their Logos
in Rainbows to Celebrate Marriage Equality, SLATE (June 26, 2015, 12:11PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2015/06/26/brands_celebrate_marriage_
equality_with_rainbows_and_supportive_tweets.html.
40
See, e.g., Lauren Copeland, Value Change and Political Action:
Postmaterialism, Political Consumerism, and Political Participation, 42 AM.
POL. RES. 257 (2014) (discussing the rise of “political consumerism” as a form of
political participation); Michael Schudson, Citizens, Consumers, and the Good
Society, 611 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 236, 239 (2007) (noting
consumer choices may be “political in even the most elevated understandings of
the term”); Dhavan V. Shah et al., Political Consumerism: How Communication
and Consumption Orientations Drive ‘Lifestyle Politics,’ 611 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
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Consider the person who drives a Toyota Prius hybrid, wears Toms
on his feet, and carries a hemp sack emblazoned with a “fair trade”
sticker when going to Whole Foods or Trader Joe’s to shop for
humanely raised, free-range chicken or a carbon-neutral, vegan,
meat substitute. This individual is acting as more than a mere
economic consumer. His purchasing decisions are simultaneously
consumptive and communicative.41 For some, the inherent
symbolism of these choices is significantly more important than
matters of quality or price.
Producers and consumers exchange money for goods and
services.42 They are also engaged in a dialogue about a wider range
of concerns—cultural, normative, and political.43 Efforts to obtain
POL. & SOC. SCI. 217, 217 (2007) (discussing “consumer behaviors that are
shaped by a desire to express and support political and ethical perspectives”);
Craig J. Thompson et al., Emotional Branding and the Strategic Value of the
Doppelgänger Brand Image, 70 J. MKTG. 50, 63 (2006) (noting research
indicating “consumers’ most valued brands are those whose symbolic meanings
play an important role in their self-conceptions”); Deitlind Stolle et al., Politics in
the Supermarket: Political Consumerism as a Form of Political Participation, 26
INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 245, 246 (2005) (noting consumer choices as political).
41
Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26 (1971) (noting that most
speech performs a “dual communicative function”).
42
See, e.g., Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Triangle (The WB television
broadcast Jan. 9, 2001) (depicting Willow, impersonating Anya: “I like money
better than people. People can so rarely be exchanged for goods and/or services”).
43
See, e.g., Craig J. Thompson, Understanding Consumption as Political
and Moral Practice, 11 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 139, 139 (2011) (“More explicitly
values-based, politicized consumption practices, such as buying Fair Trade™ or
eco-friendly goods, are often coupled with a neo-liberal belief that the
marketplace is the most efficient and effective arbiter of social values. From this
standpoint, individual consumers can most directly affect social change by voting
with their proverbial pocket books.”); Raluca Dragusanu et al., The Economics of
Fair Trade, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 217, 222 (2014) (exploring how the Free Trade
initiative provides important information to the consumer); Corrine Gendron et
al., The Institutionalization of Fair Trade: More than Just a Degraded Form of
Social Action, 86 J. BUS. ETHICS 63 (2009) (describing how the emergence of the
fair trade market is a form of social movement); Jens Hainmueller et al.,
Consumer Demand for the Fair Trade Label: Evidence from a Multi-Store Field
Experiment, 97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 242, 243 (2015) (noting that the Fair Trade
program “can be seen as a way to remove market inefficiency that exists due to
incomplete information on the part of consumer about the manner in which goods
are produced”); Geoff Moore, The Fair Trade Movement: Parameters, Issues and

300

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

greater market share are not confined to traditional marketing or
product improvement; quality and price are but two of the product
and service characteristics contemporary consumers care about.
Companies seeking to increase their market share often attempt to
align themselves with the values of desired consumer demographic
groups. Producers achieve this by engaging in value-laden
communications, inserting cultural messages into commercial
advertising and brand messaging.44 To gain a competitive advantage,
they endeavor to discover what consumers care about now, or may
care about in the future (even if only after a company communicates
about it).45 Consider, for example, the proliferation of products that
are advertised as “fair trade” or “GMO free.”46 Companies also
adopt political positions—and perhaps even take litigation

Future Research, 53 J. BUS. ETHICS 73, 74–75 (2004) (attempting to estimate the
market size of the fair trade industry).
44
See, e.g., Oliver Balch, Social Marketing: Show the World What Your
Brand’s
Values
Are,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
25,
2014),
https://www.theguardian.com/media-network/media-networkblog/2014/sep/25/social-marketing-brand-values-mcdonalds-burgers-cans
(“[S]ocial marketing, like any marketing, is commercial. Brands might not be
pushing us to buy stuff directly . . . but they benefit in other ways: an enhanced
reputation, brand equity, customer loyalty, and in some cases, lower costs or
reduced business risk.”).
45
See Walter Isaacson, The Real Leadership Lessons of Steve Jobs, HARV.
BUS. REV., Apr. 2012, at 92, 94, 97 (“When Jobs took his original Macintosh team
on its first retreat, one member asked whether they should do some market
research to see what customers wanted. ‘No,’ Jobs replied, ‘because customers
don’t know what they want until we’ve shown them.’”).
46
See, e.g., Andrew Adam Newman, This Wake-Up Cup is Fair-Trade
Certified,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
27,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/business/media/green-mountain-coffeebegins-fair-trade-campaign-advertising.html?_r=0 (describing Green Mountain
Coffee’s advertising campaign focusing on their fair-trade coffee); Food With
Integrity, CHIPOTLE MEXICAN GRILLE, http://chipotle.com/food-with-integrity
(last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (displaying Chipotle’s marketing campaign claiming
that “with every burrito we roll or bowl we fill, we’re working to cultivate a better
world”). Perhaps ironically, it appears that Chipotle spent more time burnishing
its progressive image than actually ensuring that its food was safe to eat. See Susan
Berfeld, Inside Chipotle’s Contamination Crisis, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-chipotle-food-safetycrisis/ (discussing food poisoning outbreaks at Chipotle).
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positions—as part of their effort to encourage consumer loyalty.47
Those producers that do this successfully are rewarded in the
marketplace.
The intertwined nature of commercial and cultural content
complicates the effort to consign commercial speech to a lesser
degree of constitutional protection. This contemporary reality48 may
be one reason why the Court, while leaving Central Hudson in
place, has seemed to apply a higher level of scrutiny in recent
commercial speech cases.49 If so, the Court has not said so—at least
not yet. One consequence of the Court’s reticence to consider the
broader cultural and political context in which much commercial
speech occurs is that lower courts continue to apply Central Hudson
with relatively little consideration for the broader implications of
widespread government regulation of speech with commercial
content.50 This may make judicial protection of commercial speech
more precarious than the Court’s holdings in recent commercial
speech cases would otherwise suggest.

47

To take one recent, high-profile example, when Apple refused to provide
a mechanism to unlock an iPhone used by the terrorist responsible for the attack
in San Bernadino, it defended this position to consumers and was accused by the
government of posturing for marketing purposes. See Dustin Volz & Julia
Edwards, U.S., Apple Ratchet Up Rhetoric in Fight Over Encryption, REUTERS
(Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-encryption-dojidUSKCN0VS2FT; see also In the Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone
Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300,
California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 15-0451m (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 16,
2016) Government’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities (alleging Apple
refuses to comply with Governments request to decrypt iPhone belonging to
suspect in 2016 San Bernardino shootings). For its part, Apple also argued that its
cooperation with federal law enforcement would have constituted compelled
speech in violation of the First Amendment. See Matthew Panzarino, Apple Files
Motion to Vacate the Court Order To Force it to Unlock iPhone, Citing
Constitutional Free Speech Rights, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/02/25/apple-files-motion-to-dismiss-the-courtorder-to-force-it-to-unlock-iphone-citing-free-speech-rights/.
48
For an argument that this may not, in fact, be a new development, see Troy,
supra note 28, at 123–42.
49
See cases cited supra note 33.
50
See cases cited supra note 21.
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III. SPEECH REGULATION AS RENT-SEEKING
Commercial speech is an important means for producers and
sellers to communicate information about the products and services
that they offer. Such communications extend well beyond the price
and availability of products, however. Advertising and other
commercial speech sends explicit and implicit messages about
product quality51 and desirability.52 Such speech is used to appeal to
existing consumer preferences as well as to shape such preferences
over time. As discussed above,53 advertising and other commercial
speech also incorporate cultural and normative messages that both
help develop brand identity and create or support affinity groups,
which may or may not be centered around specific products or brands.
Just as commercial speech is an effective means for producers
and sellers to communicate with consumers, restrictions on
commercial speech are a powerful means of restraining competition
and privileging the interests of some producers and sellers over
others. For this reason, it should not be surprising at all that
corporate interests have often sought to regulate commercial speech
as a means of obtaining a competitive advantage.54 In this regard,
support for commercial speech regulation can be a form of “rentseeking.”55 If a new product has a feature or characteristic that
51

See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Price and Advertising Signals of
Product Quality, 94 J. POL. ECON. 796 (1986).
52
See Scott Magids et al., What Separates the Best Customers from the
Merely Satisfied, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/12/whatseparates-the-best-customers-from-the-merely-satisfied (“Customers connect
emotionally with brands when the brand resonates with their deepest emotional
drives-things like a desire to feel secure, to stand out from the crowd, or to be the
person they want to be.”).
53
See supra notes 51–52 and accompanying text.
54
See Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 12, at 5 (“Speech regulations
seethe with public choice and collective action problems.”).
55
See Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE
506, 506 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (“Rent seeking is the socially costly
pursuit of wealth transfers.”). As Nobel laureate economist James Buchanan
observed, “[r]ent-seeking activity is directly related to the scope and range of
governmental activity in the economy, to the relative size of the public sector.”
See James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY
OF A RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980).
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differentiates it from those of existing products, incumbent
producers may seek to restrict or alter communication about those
characteristics, perhaps by placing limits on how products may be
described or characterized.56 Such use of speech regulation has a
long and sordid history.57
Commercial speech is essential for producers to differentiate
their products from competitors in the minds of consumers and
citizens. This is particularly true of new entrants to the market that
lack the brand identification, distribution networks, and brand
loyalty of more established brands. To protect themselves (and their
existing market share), incumbents are often eager to limit the
communication of their competitors, through traditional and
untraditional channels alike.58 Incumbent firms may also benefit
from across-the-board restrictions on advertising, as this may reduce
the ability of new entrants to attract market share.59
Consider recent controversies over labeling within the dairy
industry, where some dairy farmers, with the aid of biotechnology
companies, have sought to restrict commercial speech regarding the
hormones used to increase milk production.60 Bovine somatotropin

56

See Bambauer & Bambauer, supra note 12, at 6 (“[S]peech regulation can
be exploited to dispose of information that challenges entrenched interests.”).
57
For discussion of one prominent historical example, see Geoffrey P.
Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of
Butter and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 83, 108–10 (1989) (describing how the
dairy industry lobbied state legislatures for mandatory oleomargarine labeling
laws in order to thwart competition with butter).
58
See, e.g., Bruce Yandle et al., Bootleggers, Baptists, & Televangelists:
Regulating Tobacco by Litigation, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1225, 1253–54
(describing how limits on tobacco advertising benefitted incumbent tobacco
companies and “denied competitors an effective means to establish a brand”).
59
For example, major tobacco companies benefitted from advertising
restrictions that harmed smaller firms. See Jonathan H. Adler et al., Baptists,
Bootleggers, & Electronic Cigarettes, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 313 (2016) (discussing
how limits on television ads benefitted larger incumbent cigarette producers); see
also Yandle et al., supra note 58, at 1248; John E. Calfee, The Ghost of Cigarette
Advertising Past, 10 REG. 35, 41 (1986) (noting that an FTC prohibition on
comparative health claims in cigarette advertising “removed the most potent
weapon small firms had for harassing big ones”).
60
See David Barboza, Monsanto Sues Dairy in Maine Over Label’s Remarks
on
Hormones,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
12,
2003),
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(“BST”) is a naturally occurring growth hormone that affects the
amount of milk a dairy cow will produce.61 In an effort to increase
milk production, scientists learned how to synthesize BST through
modern genetic engineering techniques.62 The result is recombinant
bovine somatotropin (“rBST”), which increases milk production in
treated cows. This can increase the efficiency of dairy production,
particularly in larger firms.63
Although the use of rBST is controversial, the U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (“FDA”) maintains that milk produced from
cows treated with rBST is not appreciably different from milk from
untreated cows, and certainly no less safe.64 Indeed, the FDA
declared that any suggestion that there is a meaningful difference in
milk from treated and untreated cows would be “false and
misleading.”65 Despite these assurances, some consumers and
producers were unconvinced.66 In response to such concerns, the
state of Vermont sought to require labeling of milk and other dairy
products from cows treated with rBST, but these regulations were
struck down in federal court.67
Some dairy farms oppose the use of rBST, either because they
believe such treatments are “unnatural,” are inhumane, or perhaps
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/12/business/monsanto-sues-dairy-in-maineover-label-s-reamarks-on-hormones.html .
61
See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Interim Guidance on the Voluntary
Labeling of Milk and Milk Products from Cows That Have Not Been Treated
With Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 6279-04, 6279–80 (Feb.
10, 1994) [hereinafter FDA Guidance], https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-199402-10/html/94-3214.htm.
62
See Christopher L. Culp, Sacred Cows: The Bovine Somatotropin
Controversy, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS
47, 48 (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992) (noting that rBST was
first synthesized in 1973).
63
Id. at 55–56.
64
Bovine Somatotropin (BST), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/ProductSafetyInformation/u
cm055435.htm (last updated Oct. 19, 2016).
65
See FDA Guidance, supra note 61.
66
See, e.g., Study Shows Consumer Concern over Bovine Growth HormoneTainted Milk, ORGANIC CONSUMERS ASS’N (Sept. 17, 2003),
https://www.organicconsumers.org/old_articles/rbgh/rbgh_tainted_milk.php
(showing public concern about use of hormones in milk production).
67
See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 69–74 (2d Cir. 1995).
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even dangerous.68 Some milk producers may also believe that they
can obtain a larger market share by appealing to consumers who
prefer “organic” products or otherwise do not wish to consume
products that were produced with the aid of modern biotechnology.
Not only do such producers refuse to treat their cows with rBST,
they would also like to inform consumers of this fact, such as by
adding a voluntary “rBST free” or “No rBST” label to their
products. Prominent companies, such as Ben & Jerry’s ice cream,
supported this effort.69
Dairy farmers who use rBST understandably object to any
implication that their milk may be less desirable, or even less safe.70
For this reason, many dairy producers (and the producers of rBST)
sought to impose limits on such claims by non-rBST-using
producers.71 Rather than defend the safety and quality of their
product in an open marketplace, or supporting a broader public
education program about the technology and its uses, these
producers sought to squelch claims made by their competitors.72
68

One prominent concern is that there is a higher rate of infection in cows
treated with rbST due to the increased milk production resulting from such
treatment.
See
About
rbGH,
CTR.
FOR
FOOD
SAFETY,
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/issues/1044/rbgh/about-rbgh (last visited
Nov. 28, 2016).
69
See, e.g., rBGH, BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com/values/issueswe-care-about/rbgh (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (explaining company’s
opposition to the use of rBST); Sarah Lozanova, Back to Basics: When Ben &
Jerry’s
Dropped
rBGH,
TRIPLE
PUNDIT
(Apr.
6,
2015),
http://www.triplepundit.com/special/disrupting-short-termism/back-to-basicswhen-ben-jerrys-dropped-rgbh (discussing ice-cream maker’s decision to source
from farms not treating cows with rBST).
70
See Culp, supra note 62, at 59–60 (“Since labels are associated with
products that are considered bad or risky, they could well reduce the demand for
bst product vis-à-vis unlabeled, ‘pure’ milk products, despite the lack of any
significant chemical difference between the two.”).
71
See Keith Schneider, F.D.A. Warns the Dairy Industry Not to Label Milk
Hormone-Free,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
8,
1994),
www.nytimes.com/1994/02/08/us/fda-warns-the-dairy-industry-not-to-labelmilk-hormone-free.html (noting that F.D.A. directive against hormone-free labels
was “requested by some states and the dairy industry”).
72
See Stephen J. Hedges, Monsanto Having a Cow in Milk Label Dispute,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Apr. 15, 2007), http://www.articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-0415/news/0704140151_1_monsanto-states-growth-hormone-labels.
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In some states, dairy producers went even further, seeking to
prevent any rBST-related claims on product labels.73 In Ohio, for
example, the State Department of Agriculture adopted a rule that
considered any dairy product label that included phrases such as
“rBST free” or “Hormone Free” to be misleading.74 Insofar as all
dairy cows have hormones, the regulators may have had a point.
Nonetheless, these requirements went well beyond any need to
prevent consumer deception. The clear purpose of these restrictions
was to protect favored dairy farmers by preventing their competitors
from using commercial speech to disclose factually true information
about their products and to encourage consumers to believe that
these facts might be a reason to purchase their products.
These restrictions prompted a First Amendment challenge.75 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized these
restrictions for what they were, and pared back the legal
requirements.76 Were it not for the constitutional protection of
commercial speech, however, Ohio’s rules would have been upheld,
and conventional dairy producers would have been able to squelch
the communication of dissenting views within the commercial
marketplace. Nonetheless, some regulatory constraints on the ability
of dairy and other producers to differentiate their products on valuebased grounds remain.77
Limitations on commercial speech by competitors may harm
consumers too. Such restrictions limit the information available to
consumers, and may even impair efforts to protect public health or
73

See Andrew Martin, Fighting on a Battlefield the Size of a Milk Label,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2008) www.nytimes.com/2008/03/09/business/09feed.html
(discussing efforts to ban hormone-free labeling in New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana,
Kansas, Utah, Missouri and Vermont).
74
See Peggy Hall, Federal Court Decided Ohio Dairy Labeling Case, OHIO
AGRIC.
L.
BLOG
(Oct.
4,
2010,
3:16
PM),
https://ohioaglaw.wordpress.com/2010/10/04/federal-court-decides-ohio-dairylabeling-case/ (quoting Ohio Admin. Code § 901:11-8-01 (repealed 2012)).
75
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, No. 2:08-CV-628, 2:08-CV-629, 2009
WL 937045, at *2–4 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 2, 2009).
76
See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 635–40 (6th Cir.
2010) (holding that the Ohio rule banning claims such as “rBST free” is more
extensive than necessary to protect against consumer deception, and thus cannot
survive Central Hudson scrutiny).
77
See FDA Guidance, supra note 61.
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advance other social goals. Consider the case of reduced-risk
tobacco products and smoking alternatives. Not all tobacco products
present the same risks to consumers, and some smoking
alternatives—such as electronic cigarettes and vaping devices—
appear to present a tiny fraction of the risks posed by cigarettes.78
For this reason, many public health professionals believe that
convincing smokers to switch to alternative products would help
improve public health and reduce the death toll tobacco continues to
inflict on American society.79
Under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act,80 the makers and sellers of tobacco products and tobacco
substitutes, such as electronic cigarettes, are extremely limited in
their ability to inform consumers about the relative risks of
78

A. MCNEILL ET AL., PUB. HEALTH ENG., E-CIGARETTES: AN EVIDENCE
UPDATE–A REPORT COMMISSIONED BY PUBLIC HEALTH ENGLAND (Aug. 2015),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4
57102/Ecigarettes_an_evidence_update_A_report_commissioned_by_Public_H
ealth_England_FINAL.pdf; David J. Nutt et al., Estimating the Harms of
Nicotine-Containing Products Using the MCDA Approach, 20 EUR. ADDICTION
RES. 218, 222–24 (Apr. 2014); Peter Hajek et al., Electronic Cigarettes: Review
of Use, Content, Safety, Effects on Smokers and Potential for Harm and Benefit,
109 ADDICTION 1801, 1801–10 (2014).
79
See, e.g., Royal College of Physicians, Nicotine Without Smoke: Tobacco
Harm
Reduction,
PCR
LONDON
(Apr.
28,
2016),
https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/projects/outputs/nicotine-without-smoke-tobaccoharm-reduction-0 (encouraging the use of e-cigarettes and other tobacco
alternatives as a means of curbing smoking); Stephen S. Hecht et al., Evaluation
of Toxicant Carcinogen Metabolites in the Urine of E-cigarettes Users Versus
Cigarette Smokers, 17 NICOTINE TOBACCO RES. 704, 704–09 (2015) (finding
lower levels of toxic compounds in urine of e-cigarette users than in that of
smokers); Riccardo Polosa, Electronic Cigarette Use and Harm Reversal:
Emerging Evidence in the Lung, 13 BMC MED. 54, 54 (2015) (“[S]mokers
completely switching to regular EC use are likely to gain significant health
benefits.”); Zachary Cahn & Michael Siegel, Electronic Cigarettes as a Harm
Reduction Strategy for Tobacco Control: A Step Forward or a Repeat of Past
Mistakes?, 32 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 16, 27 (2011). A similar argument has also
been made with respect to smokeless tobacco products. See generally BRAD
RODU, FOR SMOKERS ONLY: HOW SMOKELESS TOBACCO CAN SAVE YOUR LIFE
(2013) (arguing smokeless tobacco is significantly safer than smoking regular
tobacco, while at the same time still satisfying the smoker’s craving for nicotine).
80
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009, Pub. L.
NO. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
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competing products. Federal law prohibits the sale of any tobacco
product containing a label which claims, implicitly or explicitly, that
the product presents a lower risk of tobacco-related diseases, that the
product contains a reduced level of a substance or is free of a
substance, or that uses descriptors such as “light,” or “low.”81
Tobacco products, which, under current regulations, include tobacco
alternatives such as electronic cigarettes,82 can only be marketed as
“reduced risk” products with FDA approval.83 Although these
regulations restrict purely factual claims that are supported by a fair
amount of peer-reviewed scientific research, they have withstood
legal challenge thus far.84
The nation’s largest tobacco producer, Altria (a.k.a. Philip
Morris), lobbied for and supported the federal statute limiting the
disclosure and promotion of scientific information on the relative
risks proposed by different sorts of tobacco products and their
alternatives.85 At least one opponent labeled the bill the “Marlboro
Protection Act.”86 As the dominant cigarette manufacturer—and a
firm well-positioned to make inroads into markets for tobacco
alternatives provided that competitors are hamstrung by regulatory
limitations on advertising and promotion—Altria benefited from
limitations on commercial speech. Yet such limitations on speech,
insofar as they inhibit consumer education about the relative risks of
various products, can have negative consequences on public

81

21 U.S.C. § 387(k) (2009).
Nat’l Archives and Records Admin., No. 90, Food and Drug Admin., 81 Fed. Reg
28973, 28975 (2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFD . . . /UCM394933.pdf.
83
See 21 U.S.C. § 387k(g)(1).
84
See, e.g., Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F. 3d
509, 518 (6th Cir. 2012) (rejecting, inter alia, First Amendment challenges to
federal tobacco regulations).
85
See Duff Wilson, Philip Morris’s Support Casts Shadow over a Bill to
Limit
Tobacco,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
31,
2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/01/business/01tobacco.html; C. STEPHEN
REDHEAD & VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RES. SERV., FDA TOBACCO
REGULATION: THE FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION AND TOBACCO CONTROL ACT
OF 2009 (2009).
86
See Mike Enzi, HELP Committee Passes a “Marlboro Protection Act”,
HILL (Aug. 1, 2007, 2:24 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/27745help-committee-passes-a-marlboro-protection-act-sen-mike-enzi.
82
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health.87 This is nothing new, however, as the tobacco industry long
ago discovered that limitations on advertising—and limitations on
comparative health claims in particular—is an effective means of
suppressing competition and inhibiting consumer education about
the potential health risks of their products.88
It may be tempting to think that restrictions on commercial
speech typically involve well-intentioned and public-spirited efforts
to counteract firms’ profit-seeking behavior. This is undoubtedly
true in some cases. Yet, as the above examples illustrate, some
restrictions on commercial speech are motivated by economic
concerns and represent efforts to obtain competitive advantage
through government intervention in the marketplace. Insofar as such
measures restrict information that could lead consumers to choose
less dangerous products, the consequences of such regulations are
more than economic.
IV. THE MYTH OF A CONSUMER “RIGHT-TO-KNOW”
Policymakers often advocate the use of mandatory disclosure or
other forms of speech compulsion as an alternative to traditional

87

For a broad ranging discussion of rent-seeking in the context of the
regulation of tobacco alternatives, see Jonathan H. Adler et al., Baptists,
Bootleggers, and E-Cigarettes, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 318–19 (2016).
88
See Calfee, supra note 59, at 35 (“When cigarette advertising was less
regulated, competition among manufacturers routinely led to advertisements
containing information on the health effects of smoking—much of it in blunt and
provocative language—even though this was sometimes highly destructive to the
interests of the cigarette industry as a whole. Health advertising was an effective
means of promoting one brand over another and thus was an important weapon
for smaller firms seeking to wrest business from larger firms.”); Bruce Yandle et
al., supra note 58, at 1248 (“In February 1960, the FTC announced that it had
negotiated a voluntary agreement with the tobacco companies to cut all tar and
nicotine claims from cigarette advertising. The agency heralded the ban as ‘a
landmark example of industry-government cooperation in solving a pressing
problem . . . But the ban, while in theory improving the market for safer cigarettes,
had the opposite effect. It retarded competition on the health claim margin, freeing
the companies from having to modify their product to attempt to reduce its health
hazards.”).
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forms of product regulation.89 In some cases, the argument for
mandating disclosure of product characteristics can be based upon
health risks or consumer protection concerns.90 In other cases,
mandatory product disclosures are grounded on the assertion that
there is a consumer “right-to-know” about any product
characteristics in which some set of consumers may have a
particular interest.91 This idea of a consumer right-to-know is itself
a significant threat to commercial speech, particularly when
combined with the false idea that the free flow of commercial
information is advanced by mandatory disclosure.92
Information about products and services can often improve
consumer decision-making.93 Disclosure requirements may
89

For a general discussion and critique, see, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR &
CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF
MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014).
90
See Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 35, at 447.
Prominent examples of such mandatory disclosures would be food content labels
and warnings about potential product dangers or risks.
91
See, e.g., Leo Hickman, Consumers Should Have the Right to Know if they
are Eating GM Food, GUARDIAN (April 19, 2013, 7:40 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2013/apr/19/gm-food-labellingconsumers (“Consumers should have the right to know what’s in the food they
eat—and know how it was produced.”); Roger Johnson, Consumers Have a Right
to Know Where Their Food Comes From, HILL (Aug. 5, 2014, 11:00 AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/education/214268-consumers-have-aright-to-know-where-their-food-comes-from (supporting country of origin
labels); Steve Keane, Can a Consumer’s Right to Know Survive the WTO?: The
Case of Food Labeling, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 291, 292 n.3
(2006) (citing examples of groups urging a “consumer right to know”). See
generally Frederick H. Degnan, The Food Label and the Right-to-Know, 52 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 49 (1997) (underscoring that the right-to-know idea “at its core this
perspective is the notion that the public has a basic right to know any fact it deems
important about a food or a commodity before being forced to make a purchasing
decision”); Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know,
39 ECOL. L.Q. 989 (2012) (demonstrating “how the assessment of right-to-know
interests can help resolve conflicts created by competing claims to nondisclosure
of environmental information”).
92
For an extended argument about the threat of an alleged consumer “right
to know” to the constitutional protection of commercial speech, see, e.g., Adler,
Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 35, at 426, 446.
93
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 763–64 (“Those whom the suppression of prescription drug price
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empower consumers to protect themselves from health or other risks
posed by particular products. For instance, food content
requirements help those with allergies or particular dietary needs
avoid those ingredients that may cause them harm. Mandatory
disclosures may also help address the problem of information
asymmetries,94 and may help increase consumer welfare as a result.
While information often has value, it is a mistake to assume that
more information is always better. Just as a consumer may have too
little information, a consumer may also have too much.95
information hits the hardest are the poor, the sick, and particularly aged. A
disproportionate amount of their income tends to be spent on prescription drugs;
yet they are the least able to learn, by shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist,
where their scarce dollars are best spent. When drug prices vary as strikingly as
they do, information as to who is charging what becomes more than a
convenience. It could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of
basic necessities.”); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 766 (1993) (“In the
commercial context, solicitation may have considerable value. Unlike many other
forms of commercial expression, solicitation allows direct and spontaneous
communication between buyer and seller . . . . For the buyer, it provides an
opportunity to explore in detail the way in which a particular product or service
compares to its alternatives in the market.”).
94
See David Weil et al., The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies,
25 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 155, 156 (2006) (“[I]nformation asymmetries in
market or political processes obstruct progress toward specific policy objectives.
Asymmetries arise because manufacturers, service providers, and government
agencies have exclusive access to information about products and practices and
they often have compelling reasons to keep that information confidential.”).
95
See, e.g., Lewis A. Grossman, FDA and the Rise of the Empowered
Consumer, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 627, 631 (2014) (“A surfeit of information can
overwhelm consumers, leading them to attend to it selectively or to ignore it
altogether.”); Jayson Lusk & Stephan Marette, Can Labeling and Information
Policies Harm Consumers?, 10 J. AGRIC. & FOOD INDUS. ORG. 1, 1 (2012)
(discussing how excessive information can reduce consumer welfare); Wesley A.
Magat et al., Consumer Processing of Hazard Warning Information, 1 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 201, 204 (1988) (“Manufacturers of consumer products are also
concerned with the possibility of information overload because regulatory
agencies are requiring them to include more and more information on labels, a
practice they fear will make the labels less effective as a communication
instrument.”); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and
Its Consequences for Securities Regulations, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418–19
(2003) (observing that fewer disclosures may better serve customers due to risk
of information overload); Yvette Salaüna & Karine Flores, Information Quality:
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“Information overload” is a real phenomenon.96 Consumers have
“limited time and cognitive energy” for the consideration and
analysis of information about products and services.97 Mandating
the disclosure of additional information, such as the pages of
information contained in a pharmaceutical insert, may not actually
increase consumer understanding.98 In some cases, the surfeit of
information may actually make it more difficult for some consumers
to understand which information is most important, such as which
potential risks of a product are those with which the consumer
should be most concerned.
Mandating the additional disclosure of information, if not
justified by independent interests such as a need to protect
consumers from unwitting harms, may actually harm consumer
welfare.99 Indeed, mandating excessive information disclosure may
actually result in the communication of less substantive content to
consumers and reduced consumer understanding.100 Factually true
Meeting the Needs of the Consumer, 21 INT’L J. INFO. MGMT. 21, 23 (2001)
(noting that excessive information can impose costs on consumers).
96
See, e.g., Svetlana E. Bialkova et al., Standing Out in the Crowd: The
Effect of Information Clutter on Consumer Attention for Front-of-Pack Nutrition
Labels, 41 FOOD POL’Y 65, 68 (2013) (recognizing that increases in information
can reduce consumer attention and discernment); Elise Golan et al., Economics of
Food Labeling, 24 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 117, 139 (2001) (noting that increased
disclosure requirements can result in less consumer understanding); see also W.
Kip Viscusi, Efficacy of Labeling of Foods and Pharmaceuticals, 15 ANN. REV.
PUB. HEALTH 325, 334 (1994) (evaluating what makes warning labels effective).
97
See Weil et al., supra note 94, at 158 (noting consumers have “limited time
and cognitive energy”).
98
See Sarah L. Labor et al., Information Overload with Written Prescription
Drug Information, 29 DRUG INFO. J. 1317, 1317 (1995); Jon Duke et al., A
Quantitative Analysis of Adverse Events and “Overwarning” in Drug Labeling,
171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 944, 944–46 (2011).
99
See Jane Bambauer et al., A Bad Education, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 3), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2795808.
100
See, e.g., Svetlana E. Bialkova et al., Standing Out in the Crowd: The
Effect of Information Clutter on Consumer Attention for Front-of-Pack Nutrition
Labels, 41 FOOD POL’Y 65, 69 (2013) (recognizing that increases in information
can reduce consumer attention and discernment); Elise Golan et al., Economics of
Food Labeling, 24 J CONSUMER POL’Y 117, 139 (2001) (noting that increased
disclosure requirements can result in less consumer understanding); Mario F.
Teisl & Brian Roe, The Economics of Labeling: A Overview of Issues for Health
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disclosures may also mislead consumers into thinking that
information subject to such disclosure is more important than other
product or service attributes that will actually have a greater effect
on consumer welfare.101
Most recent challenges to compelled disclosures in federal court
have been unsuccessful.102 This may be due to the Supreme Court’s
failure to fully explain how the constitutional protection afforded to
commercial speech should be applied to compelled commercial
speech. The Court’s central precedent on compelled commercial
speech is Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.103 This decision
is a bit opaque, and widely misunderstood; generally perceived (even
by some of the Justices) as an alternative to Central Hudson, when it is
better seen as an application of the same overall approach.104
Zauderer concerned an Ohio requirement that attorneys who
advertise contingent-fee rates must disclose that clients could be

and Environmental Disclosure, 27 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. REV. 141, 148
(1998) (“[S]imply increasing the amount of information on a label may actually
make any given amount of information harder to extract.”).
101
For example, warnings on trace levels of mercury in fish may take
consumer attention away from the health benefits of consuming fish high in
Omega-3 fatty acids. In this way, such warnings can actually work against efforts
to improve public health. See, e.g., Joshua T. Cohen, Matters of the Heart and
Mind: Risk-Risk Tradeoffs in Eating Fish Containing Methylmercury, RISK IN
PERSPECTIVE, Jan. 2006, at 1, 2–3, https://cdn1.sph.harvard.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/1273/2013/06/RISK_IN_PERSP_JANUARY2006.pdf
(suggesting that warnings about the danger of mercury contamination in fish to
pregnant women could have the negative effect of decreasing intake of beneficial
omega-3 oils, also found in fish).
102
See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(en banc) (upholding a regulation requiring country-of-origin labeling for meat
products); Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell 102 F. Supp. 3d 583 (D. Vt. 2015)
(upholding Vermont’s mandatory GMO food labeling law); N.Y. State Restaurant
Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding a New
York law requiring restaurants to disclose calorie counts in dishes). But see Nat’l
Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Sec. & Election Comm’n, 800 F.3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(holding that a provision of conflict mineral law requiring disclosure of use of
conflict minerals in specific language violated the First Amendment).
103
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
104
See Adler, Robert Bork & Commercial Speech, supra note 28, at 621–22
n.48.
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liable for court costs if their suits were unsuccessful.105 The
justification for this requirement was that, absent disclosure, some
consumers might be misled into thinking that a contingent-fee
arrangement protected them against any financial risk of a failed
lawsuit when, in fact, they could still be financially liable for court
costs.106 In upholding the disclosure requirement, the Court
explained a requirement that a seller or service provider disclose
factual information will be upheld so long as the requirement is not
unduly burdensome and the requirement is “reasonably related to
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”107
Some courts and commentators have read Zauderer to establish
that the compelled disclosure of factual information is subject to a
lesser degree of scrutiny than is provided by Central Hudson.108 As
I have argued elsewhere at greater length,109 this interpretation
reflects a misunderstanding of Zauderer and its place in the
constellation of the Court’s commercial speech jurisprudence.110
Zauderer concerned a mandatory disclosure that was necessary to
prevent consumer deception, which is indisputably a “substantial
interest” under the Central Hudson framework.111 Moreover, the
state’s position was that a failure to disclose could render the
105

See Am. Meat Inst.,760 F.3d at 27–28 (Rogers, J., concurring) (suggesting
Zauderer can be seen as “an application of Central Hudson”).
106
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 633.
107
Id. at 651
108
See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 28–30 (Rogers, J., concurring); Post,
Transparent and Efficient, supra note 32, at 560 (discussing how Zauderer
“advanced an extraordinarily lenient test for the review of compelled commercial
speech”).
109
See Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 35.
110
Although, to be fair, the Court’s own decisions have not been particularly
clear on this point.
111
See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 631 (invalidating a Ohio rule that banned
attorneys from advertising contingency-fee representation without also explaining
that clients would be liable for costs, on the basis that such advertising would
mislead potential clients to believe they would bear no financial risk); Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980) (“If the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful
activity, the government’s power is more circumscribed. The state must assert a
substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on commercial speech.
Moreover, the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest.”).
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regulated advertising misleading, and inherently misleading
commercial speech does not receive any protection at all.112 As the
Court held more recently in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
United States, the “essential features of the rule challenged in
Zauderer” required disclosures “intended to combat the problem of
inherently misleading commercial advertisements;” only entailed
“an accurate statement” about the nature of what was being
advertised.113
The misunderstanding and misapplication of Zauderer has led
some courts to apply the most minimal scrutiny to mandatory
disclosures and other compelled commercial speech
requirements.114 This is problematic because such mandates, even
when confined to factually true information, are often imbued with
normative and political content. The decision that some information
is more or less relevant to a consumer’s purchase decision is not a
value-free choice. There is a near-infinite number of things about a
given product or service that may interest some portion of
consumers. Choosing to prioritize or privilege some over others
necessarily embraces the judgment that some are more important or
worthy than others.
This reality justifies treating commercial speech compulsions
like speech restrictions (much as occurs in the noncommercial
speech context). Subjecting speech compulsions to Central Hudson
scrutiny does not represent an undue obstacle to legitimate
disclosure requirements, such as may be necessary for public health
or consumer protection. Most existing federal disclosure
requirements easily meet this level of scrutiny.115
112

Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638 (“The States and the Federal Government are
free to prevent the dissemination of commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or
misleading.”) (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)).
113
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 230–
31 (2010).
114
See, e.g., Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 28–30
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (Rogers, J., concurring); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272
F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Commercial disclosure requirements are
treated differently from restrictions on commercial speech because mandated
disclosure of accurate, factual, commercial information does not . . . offend core
First Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of information or
protecting individual liberty interests.”).
115
See Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 35, at 458.
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Abandoning Central Hudson in the context of compelled
commercial speech, on the other hand, makes it too easy for the
government—and concentrated interest groups—to manipulate the
flow of information in the marketplace, as well as to distort
important dialogue about broader political and cultural messages.
CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has expanded the range
of speech and expressive activity protected by the First
Amendment.116 Commercial speech has, thus far, been no exception
to this larger trend. Yet, lower courts have not been as aggressive in
the protection of commercial speech as has been the Supreme Court.
Moreover, the weight of academic commentary is decidedly critical
of constitutional protection of commercial speech, and speech by
corporations in particular.117
Because commercial speech can pose a threat to established
economic interests, the pressure to adopt new commercial speech
restrictions will continue. Insofar as courts and commentators have
a blind spot for the threat compelled commercial speech poses to the
protection of commercial speech and underlying First Amendment
values, this is likely to be an appealing avenue for those who wish
to restrict marketplace speech, whether for pecuniary or more noble
purposes. Compelled speech requirements motivated by ideological
agendas appear to be proliferating.118 Thus while the protection of
commercial speech appears to be robust today, there is no guarantee
it will continue.
116

See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010); Sorrell v. IMS
Health Care, 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011).
117
See Coates IV, supra note 9, at 225; Piety, Why Personhood Matters,
supra note 9, at 378–79.
118
To take one prominent example, some jurisdictions have imposed
mandatory disclosure requirements on abortion providers and crisis pregnancy
centers. See, e.g., B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 43
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59 (2015) (finding that some jurisdictions have imposed
mandatory disclosure requirements on crisis pregnancy centers); David
Orentlicher, Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS
9 (2015) (discussing that some jurisdictions have imposed mandatory disclosure
requirements on abortion providers).

